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ANALYSIS OF APPROVAL VOTING IN POISSON GAMES∗
FRANCO¸IS DURANDa, ANTONIN MACÉb, AND MATÍAS NÚÑEZc
ABSTRACT. We analyze Approval Voting in Poisson games endowing voters with private values
over three candidates. We first show that any stable equilibrium is discriminatory: one candidate
is commonly regarded as out of contention. We fully characterize stable equilibria and divide
them into two classes. In direct equilibria, best responses depend only on ordinal preferences.
In indirect equilibria, preference intensities matter. Counter-intuitively, any stable equilibrium
violates the ordering conditions, a set of belief restrictions used to derive early results in the
literature. We finally use Monte-Carlo simulations to estimate the prevalence of the different
sorts of equilibria and their likelihood to elect a Condorcet winner.
KEYWORDS. Approval voting, Poisson games, Stable equilibria, Monte-Carlo simulations.
JEL CLASSIFICATION. D72; C72; C63.
How does the electoral outcome depend on the voting rule? This question, quite vast, has
been addressed by both economists and political scientists in order to set the basis of electoral
engineering. Particularly useful to answer this question are the pivotal voting models in which
voters rationally choose the ballot that maximizes their expected utility. In these models, the
prediction tool is the equilibrium concept: each voter casts the ballot that maximizes his ex-
pected utility given his beliefs concerning the types and the actions of the rest of voters. Among
the different findings, a key one concerns first-past-the-post voting methods, where voters vote
for one candidate. Any such rule generates several Duvergerian (or discriminatory) equilibria
in which all votes are concentrated in two candidates (see Myerson and Weber [1993], Myer-
son [2002], Goertz and Maniquet [2011] and Bouton and Gratton [2015] among others). This
multiplicity of equilibria is particularly unappealing since they may be disconnected from the
preferences of the electorate: as long as voters anticipate that voting is almost surely pivotal
between some pair of candidates, the votes become concentrated on these two candidates which
in turn validates the voters’ anticipations.
It has been advocated [Brams, 1980, Myerson, 2002, Laslier, 2009, Goertz and Maniquet,
2011, Bouton and Castanheira, 2012, Ahn and Oliveros, 2016] that Approval Voting (hence-
forth AV) might prevent the previously mentioned flaws of first-past-the-post voting methods.
Under this rule, a voter can vote for as many candidates as he wants, and the one(s) with
the most votes wins the election. The main advantage of AV is that it gives no constraints to
the voters regarding the number of approved candidates and this can lead to huge gains from
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a collective perspective. Laslier [2009] and Myerson and Weber [1993] deliver a very sharp
prediction: namely, in equilibrium, this rule tends to uniquely select the Condorcet winner if
it exists. This prediction holds in the model of Myerson and Weber [1993], where voters’ be-
liefs meet the following two properties: (i) the higher the perceived score of a candidate, the
infinitely more likely that a vote for him becomes pivotal and (ii) pivot events involving two
candidates are infinitely more likely than pivot events in which three or more candidates are
involved. We refer in the sequel to these two properties as the ordering conditions. Building
on it, voters’ best responses are immediate since candidates’ perceived scores are enough to
determine the optimal ballots (see Laslier [2009] for a precise statement). Figure 1 illustrates
these best responses with three candidates1. Since a and b are perceived as the most serious
contenders, voters who prefer a to b approve a and those who prefer b to a vote for b. Ap-
proving of c is a best response if and only if c is preferred to the perceived winner, candidate
a. With this sharp description of best responses, the logic of the unique equilibrium is rather
clear: only a Condorcet Winner can be elected.
γa γb γc
Scores
Ordering conditions
P[pivab]ÀP[pivac]ÀP[pivbc]ÀP[tieabc]
Best responses
1. If aÂ b, approve a (and possibly c)
2. If bÂ a, approve b (and possibly c)
3. Approve c iff cÂ a
FIGURE 1. Ordering Conditions.
Yet, the status of AV in Myerson’s Poisson games is rather uncertain. Poisson games are
used for several applications in mechanism design and, in particular, they have become the
classical model to understand large elections from a game-theoretical perspective. In these
games, the size of the electorate follows a Poisson distribution, and the strategic decision of
each voter is based on endogenous pivot probabilities, rather than on ad-hoc belief restrictions.
Myerson [2002] presents an elegant example that shows a nice feature of AV in this model:
when all voters unanimously prefer some candidate, AV uniquely selects the Condorcet winner
in equilibrium whereas the Plurality rule fails to do so. However, as proved by Núñez [2010],
one can find examples in which AV fails to induce the victory of a candidate ranked first by a
majority of the electorate. Beyond these specific examples, little is known on AV equilibria in
general2, and the comparison to first-past-the-post voting methods seems difficult to establish.
Our work is the first one to give a general description of the equilibria in this game. As a
starting point, we present an in-depth description of the voter’s decision problem in order to
identify the precise events that matter to determine best responses. Focusing on stable equi-
libria, our first main contribution is to show that these equilibria must be discriminatory. In
such an equilibrium, a pair of candidates (say a and b) acts as a coordinating device: each voter
1We focus exclusively on a setting with three candidates as the vast majority of works in Poisson games.
2Myerson [2002] only provides general results for bipolar elections, in which the electorate can be divided in two
antagonist sides.
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anticipates that, conditional on being pivotal, his vote will almost surely determine whether a
or b wins the election. Thus, each voter approves either a or b but no voter approves both or
disapproves both.3
In contrast with first-past-the-post voting, the previous observation is not sufficient to deter-
mine best responses, as each voter may choose to approve c or not. This choice is driven by the
relative probabilities of the other pivots (being decisive between a and c, or between b and c).
In a first class of direct equilibria, the ratio of these probabilities diverge, and best responses
are straightforward. However, these equilibria often fail to exist. We then characterize the
remaining class of indirect equilibria, exhibiting finite pivot probability ratios, and for which
best responses may depend on cardinal utilities. We show that, for every ordinal preference
profile, there is an open set of cardinal representations of these preferences for which such an
indirect equilibrium exists. Moreover, if a Condorcet winner exists, the constructed indirect
equilibrium elects him.
As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain an important and striking result: the ordering
conditions are never satisfied in a stable equilibrium (both conditions (i) and (ii) are violated).
This finding underscores the discrepancy between the Myerson-Weber model and the model of
Poisson games. Finally, we exploit our characterization of stable equilibria to analyze numeri-
cally the prevalence of direct and indirect equilibria, and to assess the likelihood of electing a
Condorcet winner when it exists.
1. APPROVAL VOTING GAMES
1.1. Candidates and voters
We follow the model stated by Myerson [2002] and thus consider an election in which voters
elect one candidate into office from a set of candidates K = {a,b, c}. The number of voters
is drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean n.4 It follows that the common knowledge
probability that exactly p voters take part in the election equals e−n n
p
p! .
A voter’s type t determines its cardinal preferences. Throughout, we assume that prefer-
ences are strict and that two voters with the same ordinal preferences share the same cardinal
preferences. For any preference order over the candidates i Â j Â k, the corresponding type
is denoted by t := i j. Up to renormalization, we assume that voters of this type have utility
1 (resp. 0) for the victory of candidates i (resp. k), and we denote by ut ∈ (0,1) their utility
for the victory of candidate j. The type space is denoted by T = {ab,ac,ba,bc, ca, cb}. Each
voter’s type is independently drawn from T according to the preference profile denoted by
r = (r t)t∈T with ∑t∈T r t = 1. We assume that for any subsets of types T,T ′ ⊆T , with T , T ′,∑
t∈T r t ,
∑
t∈T ′ r t. Note that this implies that r t > 0 for each t ∈T . This assumption is imposed
to simplify the statements of the different results, yet it can be relaxed at the cost of more
cumbersome notation and is indeed relaxed in most examples for the purpose of simplicity. To
3The existence of discriminatory equilibria is not unattractive per se: under first-past-the-post, the problem lies
in their multiplicity [Myerson, 2002].
4In these games [Myerson, 1998], the voters’ actions uniquely depend on their private information t (common
public information). Moreover, the number of voters who choose a given ballot is independent of the number of
voters who choose another ballot (independence of actions). These two properties are used throughout.
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assess the relevance of some results, we sometimes refer to a measure on the set of preference
profiles r, which is computed with the uniform distribution on the simplex over T .
We focus on elections held under AV: voters cast a ballot for as many candidates as they
want, and the candidate receiving the highest number of votes is elected (ties are broken with
equal probability). Each voter simultaneously selects one message chosen in the set of approval
voting ballots M := {a,b, c,ab,ac,bc}. For instance, a stands for the ballot that approves can-
didate a whereas bc is the one that approves both b and c. For any ballot m and candidate k,
we note k ∈m if k is approved in m.
1.2. Strategies and Equilibria.
As usual in these models, strategies are defined type by type so that all agents of the same
type play the same strategy. Namely, a pure strategy profile is a vector σ = (σt)t∈T , where
σt ∈M for each type t. For example, if σab = c, then voters of type ab choose the ballot c. Then,
for any ballot m ∈M and any candidate k ∈K , we write
Share of ballot m : Zm ∼P (nτm) with expected share τm =
∑
t|σt=m
r t,
Score of candidate k : Sk ∼P (nγk) with expected score γk =
∑
m|k∈m
τm.
Note that the ballot profile τ= (τm)m∈M meets∑m∈M τm = 1. The ballot shares are independent
random variables whereas the candidate scores may be correlated since each voter can approve
of several candidates. We say that a candidate i is elected at a strategy profile σ if γi > γ j,γk,
as this implies that the score of i is above those of both j and k with a probability approaching
to one when n gets large.
The set Z ⊆ NM describes the possible ballot outcomes of the election, a typical element
is a vector z = (zm)m∈M where each component zm denotes the number of voters choosing
ballot m. An event is a subset of ballot outcomes E ⊆Z . Slightly abusing notation, we write
z+m for the vector z+1m (when we add 1 to the m-component only) and E−m for the event
{z ∈Z | z+1m ∈E}. The probability of a ballot outcome z ∈Z is then given by:
P[z |nτ]= ∏
m∈M
(
e−nτm(nτm)zm
zm!
)
.
For each ballot outcome z ∈Z and each candidate k, the score of k at z is noted sk(z) and the
set K(z) stands for the set of candidates with the maximal score at z:
sk(z)=
∑
m|k∈m
zm and K(z)= argmax
k∈K
sk(z).
Since ties are broken by a fair coin toss, the probability of a candidate winning the election
at z equals 1#K(z) for each candidate with a maximal score. Building on the previous notations,
the expected utility for a voter of type t when voting m is denoted by
Ut[m | nτ]=
∑
z∈Z
Ut[m | z]P[z |nτ],
where Ut[m | z] denotes the average utility of candidates in K(z+m) for type t.
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Therefore, the best response to a strategy profile σ depends only on nτ. It can be written
as BR(· | nτ) ⊆MT , where, ∀t ∈ T , BR(t | nτ) = argmaxm∈MUt[m | nτ]. We focus on a large
electorate, that is, we consider the limit behaviour when its expected size n tends to infinity.
Voting equilibria are sometimes criticized in the literature for hinging on too precise beliefs
held by voters [Fey, 1997]. In particular, Poisson voting models with private values exhibit an
absence of aggregate uncertainty, so that equilibria may rest on the knowledge of the precise
ballot profile τ. To address this concern, we focus on stable equilibria, which are immune to
the introduction of a small dose of aggregate uncertainty. Formally, this refinement coincides
with the concept of strictly perfect equilibrium for normal-form games [Okada, 1981], already
employed in Poisson games by Bouton and Gratton [2015].
Definition 1. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗t )t∈T is a stable equilibrium if ∃ ε > 0 and n0 ≥ 0
such that for any ballot profile τ in the simplex over M with |τ−τ∗| < ε and n ≥ n0, we have
σ∗t ∈BR(t | nτ), where τ∗ denotes the ballot profile associated to σ∗.
1.3. Best Responses
For any voter with type t and i ∈ {1,2,3}, we denote by ti the candidate in i-th position in his
preference ranking (for example, t1 is his most liked candidate). By a slight abuse of notation,
t1 denotes a ballot in favor of his best candidate and t1t2 a ballot in favor of his two best
candidates. Thus, depending on the context, a may denote the ballot a or the candidate a, and
ab may denote the ballot ab or the type ab. It can be shown that,5 for each ballot profile τ, each
n and each type t, Ut[t1 | nτ], Ut[t1t2 | nτ]>Ut[m | nτ] for any m ∈M \{t1, t1t2}. It follows that
w.l.o.g. the strategy set of each type t can be restricted from M to M t = {t1, t1t2}, simplifying
the strategic analysis.
Building on this observation, we introduce a graphical representation of the voting game we
analyze throughout. We represent on Figure 2 the Approval game for an arbitrary preference
profile r. Each type of voter t is located between the half-lines pointing to the ballots t1 and
t1t2. For instance, a voter of type ab chooses between ballot a (to her left) and ballot ab (to her
right).
For each size of the electorate n and each ballot profile τ, the decision of a voter of type t
reduces to determining the sign of the following expression:
∆(t | nτ)=Ut[t1 | nτ]−Ut[t1t2 | nτ]=
∑
z∈Z
P[z | nτ]
(
Ut[t1 | z]−Ut[t1t2 | z]
)
. (1)
As is well-known, for most election outcomes, altering a single ballot does not affect the
winner of the election. It follows that relatively few outcomes determine voters’ best responses.
Expression (1) can be greatly simplified by focusing only on pivot and tie events, for which the
winner of the election can indeed be affected by a single ballot, which we define below.
5More precisely, in a framework with a fixed number of voters, it is weakly dominant for a voter to approve of his
best candidate and it is weakly dominated to vote for his worst candidate (see De Sinopoli et al. [2006], Laslier and
Sanver [2010] and Bouton and Castanheira [2012]). For any t ∈T and any z ∈Z , Ut[t1 | z], Ut[t1t2 | z]≥Ut[m |
z] for any m ∈M \{t1, t1t2}. Moreover, for any size n of the electorate and any ballot profile τ, the event in which
there is exactly one voter occurs with positive probability. In this event, the previously mentioned dominance
relations become strict since each additional point matters to determine the winner.
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c
ab
b
ac bc
a rbarab
rbcrac
rcbrca
FIGURE 2. Graphical representation of the Approval game.
For each pair i j of candidates (and with k denoting the remaining candidate), we write
pivi j =
{
z ∈Z | si(z)= s j(z)> sk(z)
}
,
the pivot event where candidates i and j are tied for victory. For each K ⊆K , we let
tieK =
{
z ∈Z | si(z)= s j(z),∀i, j ∈K
}
stand for the event where all candidates in K are tied.
For each pair i j of candidates and each type t ∈ T , we denote by pivti j the event where
casting a ballot t1 or t1t2 can create a pivot between candidates i and j so that
pivti j = (pivi j−t1)∪ (pivi j−t1t2).
For each type t ∈T , we denote:
tiet,1abc = tieabc−t1 and tie
t,2
abc = tieabc−t1t2,
the events where casting a ballot t1 or t1t2 (respectively) can create a tie between the three
candidates.
Equipped with the previous notations, the following proposition shows how the utility dif-
ference ∆(t | nτ) can be expressed as a function of pivot and tie probabilities.
Proposition 1. For each ballot profile τ and each size n of the electorate, the utility difference
∆(t | nτ) for a type t can be expressed as:
P[pivtt1t2 | nτ]
(1−ut
2
)
+P[pivtt2t3 | nτ]
(−ut
2
)
+
(
2P[tiet,1abc | nτ]+P[tie
t,2
abc | nτ]
)(1−2ut
6
)
.
(2)
The main lesson of the proposition is that the best response of a voter in this game simply
depends on the sign of ∆, which is a decreasing function of ut. Therefore, when n is large
enough, for each ballot profile τ and each type t, there is some value u∗t ∈ [0,1] such that the
best responses are given by:
BR(t | nτ)=
{
t1 if ∆(t | nτ)> 0 ⇐⇒ ut < u∗t
t1t2 if ∆(t | nτ)< 0 ⇐⇒ ut > u∗t .
The precise value of u∗t depends on the ballot profile τ and depends on the relative likelihood
of pivot and tie events. For instance, consider a voter with type t who believes that pivtt2t3 ,
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tiet,1abc and tie
t,2
abc are negligible with respect to the pivot event piv
t
t1t2 . His decision is then clear
since
∆(t | nτ)∼n→∞ P[pivtt1t2 | nτ]
(1−ut
2
)
=⇒ ∆(t | nτ)> 0 for each ut ∈ (0,1).
In this case, BR(t | nτ)= t1 and u∗t = 1. A symmetric argument applies if he believes that pivtt2t3
is the only serious pivot event, implying that BR(t | nτ)= t1t2 and u∗t = 0.
Yet, it may also happen that a voter believes that pivtt1t2 , piv
t
t2t3 , tie
t,1
abc and tie
t,2
abc exhibit
finite pairwise probability ratios. In that case (and only in that case), these ratios deliver a
cutoff u∗t ∈ (0,1), such that the voter’s best response is to vote t1 if ut < u∗t , and to vote t1t2 if
ut > u∗t . We provide an example of such a situation in Section 5.4.
2. PIVOT PROBABILITIES AND THEIR MAGNITUDES
It is well known that pivot probabilities are typically hard to compute explicitly. Early papers
in the literature rely on combinatorial arguments (Palfrey and Rosenthal [1983, 1985]) or avoid
any computation by referring to the ordering conditions (Myerson and Weber [1993]). A great
insight from Myerson [2000] is to introduce the idea of a magnitude, which measures the rate of
convergence of the probability of an event to zero: when two events have different magnitudes,
their relative probabilities diverge.
Definition 2. The magnitude of an event E ⊆Z is defined by µ(E)= lim
n→∞
log(P[E |nτ])
n
.
With this definition, if µ(E) > µ(F), then limn→∞P[F | nτ]/P[E | nτ] = 0 (but the converse is
not true in general). The important advantage of working with magnitudes of pivot and tie
events is that they can be computed explicitly as the solution of a constrained minimization
program, thanks to the Dual Magnitude Theorem in Myerson [2002]. Building on this result,
we characterize the values that relevant magnitudes can take.
Theorem 1. For any ballot profile τ, any type t and any pair i j of candidates (denoting by k
the remaining candidate),
µ[pivti j]=
{
µ[tiei j] if δi j(τ)> 0,
µ[tieabc] if δi j(τ)≤ 0,
with δi j(τ)= τi
√
τ j+τ jk
τi+τik
+τi j−τ jk
√
τi+τik
τ j+τ jk
−τk,
and
µ[tiet,1abc]=µ[tie
t,2
abc]=µ[tieabc].
The theorem establishes two important properties: (i) the magnitudes of pivot events do not
depend on types; and (ii) the magnitude of a pivot i j equals either the magnitude of tiei j or
that of tieabc. The intuition for the second point stems from the interpretation of the threshold
δi j(τ) as the difference between the expected score of i and that of k, conditionally on tiei j.6
6To see why, recall that Myerson [2000, 2002] apply large deviations techniques to show that the probability of a
cone event E (such as tiei j) is concentrated (for large electorates) in outcomes for which the proportion of either
ballot is (approximatively) fixed. For each ballot m, this proportion can be expressed as the product of the ballot
share τm to its offset ratio φm. The offset ratios can be obtained as the solutions of a constrained minimization
program, whose value corresponds to the magnitude of the event E (this is the Dual Magnitude Theorem in
Myerson [2002]). For E = tiei j, it is easy to see that φk = φi j = 1 (ballots i j and k do not influence the relative
scores of i and j), while φi = 1/φ jk =
√
(τ j+τ jk)/(τi+τik). Therefore, the most likely difference in score between i
and k in the event tiei j can be written as δi j(τ)= τiφi+τi jφi j−τ jkφ jk+τkφk.
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If conditionally on tiei j, the expected score of k is below that of i, the probability of pivi j (i.e.
si = s j > sk) is equivalent to that of the tiei j. On the other hand, if conditionally on tiei j, the
expected score of k is above that of i, then pivi j becomes much less likely than tiei j, and in fact
equivalent to tieabc.
In the sequel, we write µabc =µ[tieabc] and, for each pair i j of candidates, µi j =µ[pivi j].
3. STABLE EQUILIBRIA
3.1. Stable equilibria are discriminatory
We establish a first result on the form of stable equilibria.
Theorem 2. Let σ be a stable equilibrium. Then, σ is discriminatory: µab > µac,µbc, up to a
relabelling of the candidates.
In a discriminatory equilibrium,7 voters perceive that one pivot event is infinitely more likely
than any other. If µab > µac,µbc, each voter approves of either a or b, depending on whether
he prefers a to b or the opposite (and can of course approve of c as well). As preferences are
strict, no voter approves both a and b (i.e. votes ab) or disapprove them both (i.e. votes c), so
that τab = τc = 0. Building on this observation, the following proposition provides formulas for
the magnitudes of each pivot event in any stable equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Take any ballot profile τ with τab = τc = 0. Letting
µabc =−
(p
τa−pτbc
)2− (pτb−pτac)2 ,
the magnitudes of the different pivot events are given by:
µab =
{
−(pτa+τac−pτb+τbc)2 if τacτbc < τaτb,
µabc if τacτbc ≥ τaτb,
µac =
{
−(pτa−pτbc)2 if τb < τac,
µabc if τb ≥ τac,
µbc =
{
−(pτb−pτac)2 if τa < τbc,
µabc if τa ≥ τbc.
Proposition 2 is a central tool for our analysis of stable equilibria. As a first observation,
the conditions for all two-candidate pivot magnitudes being jointly above µabc are together
incompatible, so that we always have
µabc =min
{
µab,µac,µbc
}
.
From this, we conclude that there are two sorts of stable equilibria: direct equilibria for
which µab > µac > µbc = µabc, and indirect equilibria for which µab > µac = µbc = µabc, up to a
relabelling of the candidates. While best responses can be straightforwardly inferred from the
magnitude ranking in a direct equilibrium, they may depend on precise pivot probability ratios
and on cardinal utilities in an indirect equilibrium.
7Note that Myerson [2002] defines a discriminatory equilibrium as one in which a pivot (say ab) is infinitely more
likely than the other ones, and this does not imply that pivot magnitudes are different a priori. However, we show
in the appendix (Section C.3) that the two definitions coincide for stable equilibria.
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3.2. Stable equilibria violate the ordering conditions
Before delving into the description of stable equilibria, we comment on the relation between
candidates’ expected scores and the relative likelihood of pivot events, which differs markedly
in this game with respect to alternative models of strategic voting.
If candidates’ scores were independent, one might expect that (i) pivot events involving can-
didates with higher expected scores should be infinitely more likely and (ii) a tie between
the three candidates should be infinitely less likely than a pivot between any two candidates.
These intuitive properties, known as the ordering conditions, are the main ingredients of the
early strategic voting model of Myerson and Weber [1993], and can be expressed as follows.
(ordering conditions)
{
(i) γi > γ j =⇒ µik >µ jk
(ii) ∀i, j ∈K , µi j >µabc
We know from a counter-example in Núñez [2010] that condition (i) may be violated in Pois-
son games under AV, as candidates’ scores can be correlated when some voters approve more
than one candidate. We generalize this observation and obtain the surprising result that the
condition is violated at any stable equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Every stable equilibrium violates the ordering conditions. More precisely,
1. Any direct equilibrium with µab > µac > µbc (up to a relabelling of the candidates), satisfies
γa > γc > γb. The ordering condition (i) is violated as γc > γb and yet µab >µac.
2. Any indirect equilibrium with µab >µac =µbc (up to a relabelling of the candidates), satisfies
γa,γb ≥ γc. The ordering condition (i) is violated whenever γa , γb, as µac =µbc.
3. Any stable equilibrium violates the ordering condition (ii) as µabc =min{µab,µac,µbc}.
The result is important as it suggests that, for the analysis of strategic voting under AV,
the model of Poisson games is fundamentally different from models where the ordering con-
ditions prevail. It appears that the ordering conditions are useful but somewhat arbitrary
belief restrictions, that do not capture the real relative likelihood of pivot events obtained in
models where pivot probabilities are endogenous. In the sequel, we show how to characterize
equilibria in such a model, without imposing any belief restriction.
4. DIRECT EQUILIBRIA
This section considers the simplest stable equilibria: direct equilibria, in which the magni-
tudes of pivot events fully determine voters’ best responses. We first characterize preference
profiles admitting a direct equilibrium, for a given ordering of pivot magnitudes. Then, we
show that many preference profiles do not admit any direct equilibrium.
4.1. Equilibrium Characterization.
In order to illustrate the logic of direct equilibria in any preference ordering, assume for
instance that µab > µac > µbc. In any such equilibrium, the strict ordering of the magnitudes
implies that:
P[pivab | nτ]Àn→∞ P[pivac | nτ]Àn→∞ P[pivbc | nτ],P[pivabc | nτ].
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In turn, this implies that best responses are uniquely determined when n is large, and that
cardinal utilities do not matter. The best responses for each type are represented in Figure 3,
where, for instance, the arrow from rab to a means that BR(ab | nτ)= a.
c
ab
b
ac bc
a rbarab
rbcrac
rcbrca
BR(ab | nτ)=BR(ac | nτ)= a
BR(bc | nτ)=BR(cb | nτ)= bc
BR(ba | nτ)= b
BR(ca | nτ)= ac
FIGURE 3. Best responses (for n large) in a direct equilibrium with µab >µac >µbc.
In words, as pivot ab dominates, each voter approves of his favorite candidate between a
and b. Next, as pivot ac comes second, a voter approves of c if and only if he prefers c to a. It
follows that
τa = rab+ rac, τb = rba, τac = rca, τbc = rbc+ rcb, τc = τab = 0. (∗)
The constructed strategy profile σ is indeed a direct equilibrium if the associated ballot
profile τ triggers the magnitude ordering µab >µac >µbc.
As τab = τc = 0, Proposition 2 implies that the magnitude ordering is indeed satisfied if and
only if:
τa
τbc
> τac
τb
> 1 and − (pτa+τac−pτb+τbc)2 >−(pτa−pτbc)2 . (∗∗)
To conclude, we obtained a characterization of direct equilibria:8 a preference profile r ad-
mits a direct equilibrium if and only if conditions (∗) and (∗∗) can be jointly satisfied for some
labelling of the candidates.
4.2. Existence
In this section we show that, for many preference profiles, a direct equilibrium does not exist.
To see why, observe that, by combining conditions (∗) and (∗∗), we obtain that a necessary
condition to have a direct equilibrium with µab >µac >µbc is to have:
ra
r−a
> rca
rba
> 1,
where ra denotes the share of voters who rank a first and r−a denotes the share of voters who
rank a last.
Consider the preference profile r, denoting a symmetric Condorcet cycle: rab = rbc = rca = 1/3
so that rk/r−k = 1 for k = a,b, c. It is then immediate to see that the preference profile r does
not admit a direct equilibrium. By extension, we can prove that the non-existence of a direct
8Note that direct equilibria are indeed stable, since the magnitude ordering remains the same in a neighborhood
of τ, by virtue of condition (∗∗).
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equilibrium remains true in a neighborhood of this preference profile. We thus obtain the
following result.
Proposition 3. The set of preference profiles admitting no direct equilibrium is of positive
measure.
This result is important for the analysis of Poisson voting games: in many cases, there is
no equilibrium with a strict pivot magnitude ordering. This implies that we often need to
look beyond pivot magnitudes to derive voters’ best responses, a step that is undertaken in
Section 5.
4.3. Quantitative Assessment
To assess quantitatively the prevalence of direct equilibria, we performed Monte-Carlo sim-
ulations consisting of 100,000 draws of the preference profile r, the draws being independent
and uniform on the simplex over T .
As a first observation, we note that direct equilibria exist in 27.7% of the preference profiles.
This reinforces the conclusion of Proposition 3: only looking at direct equilibria would not allow
to understand strategic behavior under AV in a large number of situations.
To go further, we would like to identify preference profiles for which direct equilibria exist
(or do not). As a first step, we might hint from earlier models operating with the ordering con-
ditions that direct equilibria are unlikely to be found when a Condorcet cycle exists.9 Numeri-
cally, we find that this intuition is almost exact: there appears to be around 0.1% of preference
profiles admitting a Condorcet cycle for which a direct equilibrium exists.
When the preference profile admits a Condorcet winner, we observe that a direct equilibrium
exists only for 29.8% of the preference profiles (as a reference, such an equilibrium always
exists under the ordering conditions). Focusing on the candidate that can be elected at a direct
equilibrium, we observe that it is almost always the Condorcet winner. More precisely, 29.7% of
the profiles admit a direct equilibrium electing the Condorcet winner, but no direct equilibrium
electing another candidate. Less than 0.1% of the profiles admit a direct equilibrium electing
a non-Condorcet winner, but no direct equilibrium electing the Condorcet winner.10 Finally,
only 3 profiles over our 100,000 draws admit both a direct equilibrium electing the Condorcet
winner, and another direct equilibrium electing another candidate.
4.4. An Example of Direct Equilibrium
We consider an electorate composed of three types of voters: ab, ba and ca with respective
shares
rab =
3
10
, rba =
3
10
and rca = 410 .
9The logic is quite straightforward under the ordering conditions. As argued in the introduction, any equilibrium
with γa > γb > γc satisfying the ordering conditions is such that
γa =
∑
t : aÂb
r t,γb =
∑
t : bÂa
r t and γc =
∑
t : cÂa
r t.
As γa > γb, we obtain that a majority prefers a to b, so that γa > 1/2> γb. As we have a Condorcet cycle, a majority
prefers c to a, so that γc > 1/2, hence a contradiction with γb > γc.
10 Such a situation, with both one equilibrium electing the Condorcet Winner and one not electing him, was first
presented in Núñez [2010].
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Since we look for a direct equilibrium, preference intensities do not play any role and we
leave the values uab, uba and uca unspecified. This preference profile admits a unique direct
equilibrium σ with
σab = a,σba = b and σca = ac.
The strategy profile σ is depicted in Figure 4, together with candidates’ expected scores.
c
ab
b
ac bc
a rab = 0.3 rba = 0.3
rca = 0.4
(A) Strategies of the voters.
γa γb γc
Scores
5
10
1
10
(B) Candidates expected scores.
FIGURE 4. A direct equilibrium with µab >µac >µbc.
The strategy profile thus leads to the victory of the Condorcet winner a. As τc = τab = 0, we
may apply the formulas in Proposition 2, and we obtain µab >µac >µbc since
µab =−0.0835 with τacτbc = 0< τaτb,
µac =−0.3 with τb < τac,
µbc =µabc =−0.3071 with τbc = 0< τa.
As we observed earlier, the ordering condition (i) is violated in this example, as µab is maxi-
mal, but candidates a and c have the two highest scores. Note that this example does not hinge
of the precise type distribution, as, for each 0 ≤ η < 3, letting rη denote the type distribution
with
rηab =
3+η
10
, rηba =
3−η
10
and rηca =
4
10
,
the strategy profile σ is a direct equilibrium since, for each 0≤ η< 3,
µab =−(
√
7+η
10
−
√
3−η
10
)2 >µac =−3+η10 >µbc =µabc =−
3+η
10
−
√3−η
10
−
√
4
10
2 .
5. INDIRECT EQUILIBRIA
This section considers the second kind of stable equilibria: indirect equilibria in which the
magnitudes of pivot events do not fully determine voters’ best responses. We first show how
to derive best responses by estimating the likelihood ratios of pivot events. Then, we provide
a general existence result: for any ordinal preference profile, there exists a specification of
cardinal preferences for which an indirect equilibrium exists.
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5.1. Equilibrium Characterization
Let σ be a strategy profile such that µab >µac =µbc =µabc. Looking at Proposition 2, a ballot
profile τ generates this ordering of magnitudes if and only if τb ≥ τac, τa ≥ τbc and τaτb > τacτbc.
As illustrated on Figure 5, the best response is fully determined for types ab, ba, cb and ca
(solid arrows), because the pivot ab dominates. However, types ac and bc need to assess the
relative likelihood of pivot events ac, bc and abc: their best response is indeterminate (dashed
arrows).
c
ab
b
ac bc
a rbarab
rbcrac
rcbrca
FIGURE 5. Best responses (for n large) in an indirect equilibrium with µab >µac =µbc.
To determine the best responses of types ac and bc, we compute for each type the relative
probabilities of pivots ac, bc and tie abc. A central tool for this analysis is the notion of an
offset ratio. Intuitively, the offset ratio φm of a ballot m at an event E corresponds to the most
likely share of ballots m when E occurs, divided by its expected value nτm. As shown in the
next result, the offset ratios in the event tieabc constitute sufficient statistics to compute the
relative likelihood of any relevant pivot event with respect to tieabc.
The values of these offset ratios are obtained as follows. Applying the Dual Magnitude
Theorem [Myerson, 2002], the magnitude µ[tieabc] equals the optimal value of
min
x,y∈R
τaex+y+τacex+τbe−x+τbce−(x+y)−1.
Moreover, denoting by (x∗, y∗) the values of x, y at the optimum, the offset ratios are given by:
φa = ex
∗+y∗ =
√
τbc
τa
, φb = e−x
∗ =
√
τac
τb
, φac = 1/φb and φbc = 1/φa. (3)
The following result derives the relative likelihood of pivot and tie events and characterizes
indirect equilibria.
Theorem 4. Let σ be a stable equilibrium such that µab > µac = µbc (indirect equilibrium).
Then, for t ∈ {ac,bc}:
1. The probabilities of pivot and tie events satisfy:
∀{i, j}= {a,b}, limn→∞
P[pivtic | nτ]
P[tieabc | nτ]
= φ j
1−φ j
(
φt1 +φt1t2
)
,
limn→∞
P[tiet,1abc | nτ]
P[tieabc | nτ]
=φt1 ,
limn→∞
P[tiet,2abc | nτ]
P[tieabc | nτ]
=φt1t2 .
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2. There exists a cutoff u∗t ∈ (0,1) such that{
ut < u∗t ⇒σt = t1,
ut > u∗t ⇒σt = t1t2,
and given by
u∗t =
f t(φt1t2)
f t(φt1t2)+ f t(1/φt1)
with f t(y)=φt1 + (φt1 +φt1t2)
(
y+2
y−1
)
,
where the offset ratios are the ones associated to tieabc.
5.2. Existence and Condorcet consistency
Contrary to direct equilibria, we establish that indirect equilibria exist for any ordinal pref-
erence profile r (at least for some values of the preference intensities). Moreover, we obtain that
the equilibrium we construct elects the Condorcet winner when he exists, a property referred
to as Condorcet consistency.
Let r be an ordinal preference profile and let a be a candidate such that ra > r−a (the share of
voters who rank a first is larger than the share of voters who rank a last). Let b be a candidate
such that rba > rca.11 We will show that there exists some u ∈ (0,1)T for which an equilibrium
exists with µab >µac =µbc. Let σ be the strategy profile defined by:
σab =σac = a, σbc =σcb = bc, σba = b and σca = ac.
Under this strategy profile, we know that τa = ra,τb = rba,τac = rca,τbc = r−a and τc = τab =
0. By assumption, we thus have τa > τbc, τb > τac and τaτb > τacτbc. Therefore, we obtain from
Proposition 2 that the ordering µab >µac =µbc is indeed satisfied under the strategy profile σ.
From the magnitude ordering, we know directly that σt =BR(t | nτ) for any type t ∈ {ab,ba, ca, cb}.
Following the proof of Theorem 4, there exists for each t ∈ {ac,bc} a number u∗t ∈ (0,1) such that,
for n large enough: ut < u∗t ⇒BR(t | nτ)= t1 and ut > u∗t ⇒BR(t | nτ)= t1t2. We conclude that,
for uac small enough and ubc large enough, the strategy profile σ is an indirect equilibrium.12
Finally, let us consider the case where a profile r admits a Condorcet winner, say a, and let
us show that ra > r−a. As a majority prefers a to b, we have that ra + rca > r−a + rba; as a
majority prefers a to c, we have that ra+ rba > r−a+ rca. Thus, ra− r−a > |rca− rba| > 0. Since
γa = ra+ rca, γb = r−a+ rba and γc = r−a+ rca, the candidate a is elected, and we thus obtain
the following result.
Proposition 4. For any ordinal preference profile r, there exists an open set of cardinal repre-
sentations u ∈ (0,1)T such that an indirect equilibrium exists. If r admits a Condorcet winner,
it is elected at the constructed equilibrium.
11Such candidates must exist since for any subsets of types T,T ′ ⊆T , with T , T ′, ∑t∈T r t ,∑t∈T ′ r t by assump-
tion.
12Note that the magnitude ordering is preserved in a neighborhood of τ, and that each u∗t is a continuous function
of τ. Thus, the strategy profile σ is indeed a stable equilibrium.
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5.3. Quantitative Assessment
As for direct equilibria, we conducted Monte-Carlo simulations to assess indirect equilibria.
Building on the equilibrium characterization in Theorem 4, we can describe the set of cardi-
nal preferences allowing the existence of any potential indirect equilibrium, for each ordinal
preference profile r. Thus, we first draw 200,000 ordinal preference profiles r: 100,00 draws
uniformly on the subset of the simplex on T for which a Condorcet winner exists; and 100,000
draws uniformly on the subset of the simplex on T for which a Condorcet cycle exists. Then,
for each draw, we can compute explicitly the probability of existence (resp. of co-existence) of
any indirect equilibrium (resp. of any set of indirect equilibria), assuming that utilities (ut)t∈T
are drawn uniformly on [0,1], and independently across types.
We first present the distribution of the probabilities of existence of a stable equilibrium over
the universe of ordinal preference profiles, when a Condorcet winner exists. This distribution is
plotted in Figure 6. We observe on the right the 29.8% of ordinal preference profiles for which
an equilibrium exists with probability one, which corresponds to direct equilibria (note that
indirect equilibria may also exist at these profiles). For all other ordinal preference profiles,
we observe that an (indirect) equilibrium exists with strictly positive probability, as shown in
Proposition 4. Furthermore, we see that this probability of existence is significant, above 30%
for most ordinal preference profiles.
FIGURE 6. Distribution of the probabilities of existence of a stable equilibrium
when a Condorcet winner exists
As we know that direct and indirect equilibria may coexist at a given preference profile, one
may wonder whether different candidates may be elected for the same profile. We draw on
Figure 7 the distribution of the number of candidates that can be elected at a stable equilib-
rium for a given (cardinal) preference profile, when a Condorcet winner exists. We observe
that whenever a stable equilibrium exists (at least one possible winner), it is very rare that 2
candidates be potential winners of the election (1.9% of all cardinal preference profiles).
Then, we investigate whether the likely winner of the election is the Condorcet winner or
not. To that aim, we plot on Figure 8 two distributions: the probabilities of existence of a
stable equilibrium electing the Condorcet winner (resp. electing a non-Condorcet winner) over
the universe of ordinal preference profiles, when a Condorcet winner exists. We observe that
for most ordinal preference profiles, only a Condorcet winner can be elected. For around 15%
of all ordinal profiles, a non-Condorcet winner may be elected, but with a small probability,
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FIGURE 7. Distribution of the number of possible winners at a stable equilib-
rium when a Condorcet winner exists
typically smaller than the probability with which there exists a stable equilibrium electing the
Condorcet winner.
FIGURE 8. Distributions of the probabilities of existence of a stable equilibrium
electing the Condorcet winner (resp. electing a non-Condorcet winner), when a
Condorcet winner exists
Finally, we consider profiles for which no Condorcet winner exists: there is a Condorcet
cycle. We report on Figure 9 the distribution of the probabilities of existence of an equilibrium
for these preference profiles. We observe that there always is a significant probability that an
(indirect) equilibrium exists. This can be seen as an improvement over earlier models which
didn’t provide any prediction for these preference profiles [Laslier, 2009].
FIGURE 9. Distribution of the probabilities of existence of an equilibrium when
a Condorcet cycle exists
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Finally, we report on Figure 10 the distribution of the number of candidates that can be
elected at a stable equilibrium for a given (cardinal) preference profile, when a Condorcet cycle
exists. We observe that when a stable equilibrium exists, the possible winner is most likely
unique. Moreover, there are rare cases for which any of the three candidates may be elected at
a stable equilibrium (for around 1.9% of all cardinal preference profiles).
FIGURE 10. Distribution of the number of possible winners at a stable equilib-
rium when a Condorcet cycle exists
5.4. An Example of Indirect Equilibrium
We consider an electorate composed of four types of voters to illustrate indirect equilibria
characterized in the previous section: ab, bc, ca and cb with respective shares
rab =
3
10
, rbc =
3
10
, rca = 2+η10 and rcb =
2−η
10
,
with 0 ≤ η < 1. The equilibrium that we analyse does not depend on uab, uca and ucb. Yet,
ubc remains to be specified since best responses depend on its precise value. It can be shown
that this preference profile does not admit any direct equilibrium since conditions (*) and (**)
cannot be jointly satisfied for any labelling of the candidates.
This preference profile admits an indirect equilibrium σ defined by
σab = a, σbc = b, σca = ac and σcb = bc.
The strategy profile σ is depicted in Figure 11, together with candidates’ corresponding
expected scores.
The strategy profile σ leads to the victory of a since γa > γb > γc for any η. As τab = τc = 0,
pivot magnitudes can be computed as in Proposition 2. We obtain:
µab =
√
(5+η)(5−η)
5
−1 since τacτbc < τaτb,
µac =µbc =µabc =
√
3(2+η)+√3(2−η)
5
−1 since τb ≥ τac and τa ≥ τbc.
One can check that µab > µac = µbc = µabc for any 0 ≤ η < 1 as required. Building on Proposi-
tion 1, the best responses of the different types of voters are as follows: (i) ab-voters approve
only a since µab is maximal , (ii) ca-voters approve of c since c is their most preferred can-
didate and approve of a since µab is maximal and (iii) cb-voters approve of c since c is their
most preferred candidate and approve of b since µab is maximal.
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c
ab
b
ac bc
a rab = 0.3
rbc = 0.3
rcb = 2−η10rca =
2+η
10
(A) Strategies of the voters.
γa γb γc
Scores
5
10
1
10
5+η
10
5−η
10 4
10
(B) Candidates’ expected scores.
FIGURE 11. An indirect equilibrium with µab >µac =µbc
The decision of bc-voters relies on the exact relative likelihoods of pivot events, which are
obtained from the offset ratios. Recall that, for t= bc, ∆(t | nτ) equals:
P[pivtac | nτ]
(1−ubc
2
)
+P[pivtbc | nτ]
(−ubc
2
)
+
(
2P[tiet,1abc | nτ]+P[tie
t,2
abc | nτ]
)(1−2ubc
6
)
.
As shown by Theorem 4, the limit ratio of pivot probabilities equals, for t= bc,
lim
n→∞
P[pivtac | nτ]
P[tieabc | nτ]
= φb
1−φb
(
φb+φbc
)
, lim
n→∞
P[pivtbc | nτ]
P[tieabc | nτ]
= φa
1−φa
(
φb+φbc
)
,
lim
n→∞
P[tiet,1abc | nτ]
P[tieabc | nτ]
=φb, limn→∞
P[tiet,2abc | nτ]
P[tieabc | nτ]
=φbc.
where the offset ratios are given by:
φa =
√
τbc
τa
=
√
2−η
3
, φb =
√
τac
τb
=
√
2+η
3
, φac =
√
3
2+η and φbc =
√
3
2−η .
Therefore, we can conclude that BR(bc | nτ)= b if and only if ubc < u∗(η) with
u∗(η)=
φb+ (φb+φbc)
(
φbc+2
φbc−1
)
2φb+ (φb+φbc)
(
φbc+2
φbc−1
+ φac+2
φac−1
) .
It can be shown that u∗(0) = 0.5, u∗(1) = 0 and that u∗(η) is decreasing in η for 0 ≤ η < 1. To
conclude, σ is an equilibrium as long as ubc < u∗(η).
As shown in Theorem 3, the indirect equilibrium σ violates the ordering condition (i), since
we have µac = µbc, and yet γa > γc. We even observe more precisely that the ratio P[pivtac |
nτ]/P[pivtbc | nτ] tends to a positive constant as n gets large. This observation extends to indi-
rect equilibria in general, by direct application of Theorem 4.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper gives an in-depth account of Approval Voting with private values in the main
setting for understanding strategic voting: Poisson games. It first proves that stable equilibria
are discriminatory, which means that a pivot is infinitely more likely than the other ones, so
that a pair of candidates focuses the attention of the electorate. It then divides stable equilibria
into two main classes: direct and indirect ones. In a direct equilibrium, pivot magnitudes
differ and best responses are immediate, whereas in an indirect one, some pivot magnitudes
coincide which renders best responses dependent on preference intensities. Above all, the
main result of this work is that no stable equilibrium satisfies the ordering conditions, a set
of belief restrictions used in early works to derive predictions on AV. This violation is partly
a consequence of the correlation of candidates’ scores, arising under AV in Poisson games, but
which does not occur in the models of Myerson and Weber [1993] and Laslier [2009]. Building
on the previous description of equilibria, we have run Monte-Carlo simulations that give us
global figures on the structure of stable equilibria under AV. Among the different findings, we
can underline two of them.
The first finding concerns the existence of indirect equilibria. These equilibria are, to our
knowledge, novel in the literature. Quantitatively, indirect equilibria are important. First,
there always exists an indirect equilibrium, at least for some preference intensities, while
there are many ordinal preference profiles for which no direct equilibrium exists, even for
profiles admitting a Condorcet winner. Second, we observe that the actual probabilities with
which an indirect equilibrium exists are significant, both when a Condorcet winner exists and
when there is a Condorcet cycle.
The second finding concerns the Condorcet consistency of AV. When a Condorcet winner ex-
ists, there always exists an indirect equilibrium that elects him, at least for some preference
intensities. If in addition, there exists a direct equilibrium, it is very likely that this equi-
librium elects the Condorcet winner. Overall, the probabilities of having a stable equilibrium
electing the Condorcet winner are much higher than having a stable equilibrium electing an-
other candidate (Figure 8).
As a final remark on this work, we investigate what would happen in Poisson games if the
correlation in candidates’ scores was assumed away. We observe that our methods can be
profitably exploited to analyse that case. More precisely, we introduce a behavioral twist in the
analysis: voters neglect correlation, that is, they compute pivot probabilities and magnitudes
as if the scores of the different candidates were independent.13 As we show in the appendix
(Section B), this alternative model yields the following result.
Theorem 5. In the presence of correlation neglect, any equilibrium with γa > γb > γc is either:
1. a direct equilibrium with µab >µac >µbc, if γ2b < γaγc.
2. an indirect equilibrium with µab >µac =µbc, if γ2b ≤ γaγc.
13While this extension is here developed as a sanity check, the literature on correlation neglect is now firmly
established in the economics literature (see Levy and Razin [2015] among others). This behavioral twist, called
correlation neglect is grounded on the inability of voters to understand the consequences of correlation and is
considered in the literature as a plausible restriction on beliefs. Moreover, on practical terms, it simplifies the
analysis as the pivot magnitudes anticipated by voters who neglect correlation just depend on the scores of the
candidates and not anymore the share of the different ballots as in the classical analysis.
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This result underlines that indirect equilibria exist independently of the correlation between
candidates’ scores.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We describe in-depth the decision problem of a voter with type i j (with k denoting the
remaining candidate). As the type t is fixed in this proof, we will write u for ut. By definition,
we have
Ut[i | nτ]−Ut[i j | nτ]=
∑
z∈Z
P[z | nτ]
(
Ut[i | z]−Ut[i j | z]
)
. (4)
Like we did for the particular case of two candidates, we define for each K ⊆K the event
pivK =
{
z ∈Z | si(z)= s j(z)> sk(z),∀i, j ∈K ,∀k ∉K
}
, where all candidates in K are tied and
have larger scores than the other candidates. Note that pivabc = tieabc. The expected utility of
a voter with type t approving of i equals:
Ut[i | nτ]=
Single-winner events︷                                                ︸︸                                                ︷
P[pivi−i] ·1+P[piv j−i] ·u+P[pivk−i] ·0
+
Two-way pivots︷                                                            ︸︸                                                            ︷
P[pivi j−i]
(1+u
2
)
+P[pivik−i]
(1
2
)
+P[piv jk−i]
(u
2
)
+
Three-way tie︷                    ︸︸                    ︷
P[pivabc−i]
(1+u
3
)
,
whereas the expected utility of this voter approving of both i and j at event z equals:
Ut[i j | nτ]=
Single-winner events︷                                                    ︸︸                                                    ︷
P[pivi−i j] ·1+P[piv j−i j] ·u+P[pivk−i j] ·0
+
Two-way pivots︷                                                                 ︸︸                                                                 ︷
P[pivi j−i j]
(1+u
2
)
+P[pivik−i j]
(1
2
)
+P[piv jk−i j]
(u
2
)
+
Three-way tie︷                     ︸︸                     ︷
P[pivabc−i j]
(1+u
3
)
,
Thus, the difference between both expected utilities, Ut[i | nτ]−Ut[i, j | nτ] equals:(
P[pivi−i]+P[piv j−i]u+P[pivi j−i]
1+u
2
+P[pivik−i]
1
2
+P[piv jk−i]
u
2
+P[pivabc−i]
1+u
3
)
−(
P[pivi−i j]+P[piv j−i j]u+P[pivi j−i j]
1+u
2
+P[pivik−i j]
1
2
+P[piv jk−i j]
u
2
+P[pivabc−i j]
1+u
3
)
.
The previous expression can be simplified due to the following observations.
Note first that (pivi−i)= (pivi−i j)∪ (pivi j−i j). Hence,
P[pivi−i]−P[pivi−i j]−P[pivi j−i j]
1+u
2
=P[pivi j−i j]
1−u
2
. (5)
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Similarly, observe that (piv j−i j)= (piv j−i)∪ (pivi j−i)∪ (piv jk−i)∪ (pivabc−i). Thus,
P[piv j−i]u+P[pivi j−i]
1+u
2
+P[piv jk−i]
u
2
+P[pivabc−i]
1+u
3
−P[piv j−i j]u (6)
=P[piv j−i](u−u)+P[pivi j−i]
(1+u
2
−u
)
+P[piv jk−i]
(u
2
−u
)
+P[pivabc−i]
(1+u
3
−u
)
=P[pivi j−i]
1−u
2
+P[piv jk−i]
(
− u
2
)
+P[pivabc−i]
1−2u
3
.
Finally, following a similar reasoning, one can see that (pivik−i) = (pivik−i j)∪ (pivabc−i j)
and therefore,
P[pivik−i]
1
2
−P[pivik−i j]
1
2
−P[pivabc−i j]
1+u
3
=P[pivabc−i j]
(1
2
− 1+u
3
)
(7)
=P[pivabc−i j]
1−2u
6
.
Combining equalities (5) to (7), (1) can be rewritten as :(
P[pivi j−i]+P[pivi j−i j]
)1−u
2
+
(
P[piv jk−i]+P[piv jk−i j]
)(
− u
2
)
+P[pivabc−i]
1−2u
3
+P[pivabc−i j]
1−2u
6
.
Finally, we obtain the desired expression by observing that pivti j = (pivi j−i)∪ (pivi j−i j),
pivtjk = (piv jk−i)∪ (piv jk−i j) , tiet,1abc = (pivabc−i) and tie
t,2
abc = (pivabc−i j).

A.2. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. As a direct application of the Magnitude Equivalence Theorem in Núñez [2010], one can
show that for any ballot profile τ, any type t and any pair i j of candidates we have:
µ[pivti j]=µ{si = s j ≥ sk} and µ[tiet,1abc]=µ[tie
t,2
abc]=µ[tieabc].
It remains to be shown that for any ballot profile τ , µ{si = s j ≥ sk} ∈ {µ[tiei j],µ[tieabc]}. To do
so, we first apply the Dual Magnitude Theorem of Myerson [2002]. We can write:
µ[tieabc]= min
x,y∈R
f (x, y), µ{si = s j ≥ sk}= min
x∈R,y≥0
f (x, y), µ[tiei j]= min
x∈R,y=0
f (x, y)
where
f (x, y)= τi ex+y+τikex+τ j e−x+τ jke−(x+y)+τke−y+τi j ey−1.
The function f is strictly convex as
∂2 f
∂x2
= ex(τi ey+τik)+ e−x(τ j+τ jke−y)> 0 and:
∂2 f
∂x2
× ∂
2 f
∂y2
−
(
∂2 f
∂x∂y
)2
= [ex(τi ey+τik)+ e−x(τ j+τ jke−y)]×[
ey(τi ex+τi j)+ e−y(τk+τ jke−x)
]− (τi ex+y+τ jke−(x+y))2 > 0.
As | f (x, y)| becomes large when either |x| or |y| is large, f admits a unique critical point
(x∗∗, y∗∗) ∈ R2. The value y∗∗ solves for miny∈R f (x∗(y), y), where x∗(y) = argminx∈R f (x, y) is
uniquely defined. We have two cases to consider:
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• Either ∂ f
∂y
(x∗(0),0) > 0. In that case, y∗∗ < 0, and we obtain that µ{si = s j ≥ sk},µ[tiei j] >
µ[tieabc]. Moreover, we have:
µi j = min
x∈R,y≥0
f (x, y)=min
y≥0
f (x∗(y), y)= f (x∗(0),0)= min
x∈R,y=0
f (x, y)=µ[tiei j].
• Or ∂ f
∂y
(x∗(0),0)≤ 0. In that case, y∗∗ ≥ 0, and we obtain that µ{si = s j ≥ sk}=µ[tieabc].
To conclude, the value x∗(0) is obtained by setting
0= ∂ f
∂x
(x∗(0),0)= ex∗(0)(τi+τik)− e−x
∗(0)(τ j+τ jk),
and we get ex
∗(0) =
√
τ j+τ jk
τi+τik
. Finally, we write
∂ f
∂y
(
x∗(0),0
)= τi ex∗(0)+τi j−τk−τ jke−x∗(0) = δi j(τ).
As wanted, we have shown that µ{si = s j ≥ sk} is equal to either µ[tiei j], if δi j(τ) > 0, or to
µ[tieabc] otherwise. 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. By application of the Dual Magnitude Theorem, as in the proof of Theorem 1, we have
µabc = min
x,y∈R
τaex+y+τacex+τbe−x+τbce−(x+y)−1,
which implies that µabc =−
(p
τa−pτbc
)2− (pτb−pτac)2 .
By application of Theorem 1, the formula for the magnitude µab depends on the sign of:
δab(τ)= τa
√
τb+τbc
τa+τac
−τbc
√
τa+τac
τb+τbc
.
We obtain that
δab(τ)> 0 ⇔ τa(τb+τbc)> τbc(τa+τac) ⇔ τaτb > τacτbc.
When this inequality is satisfied, we may write:
µab =µ[tieab]= min
x∈R,y=0
τaex+y+τacex+τbe−x+τbce−(x+y)−1=−
(p
τa+τac−
p
τb+τbc
)2 .
The formulas for the magnitudes µac and µbc are obtained in a similar fashion and are hence
omitted.

A.4. Proof of Theorem 2
We first prove a lemma, relating a candidates’ expected scores to pivot magnitudes.
Lemma 1. Let σ be a strategy profile with associated expected score γ. We have the following:
(i) If γa,γb > γc, then µab >µabc
(ii) If γa = γb > γc, then µab >µac =µbc =µabc
(iii) If γa > γb,γc, then µbc =µabc
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(iv) If γa > γb = γc, then µbc =µabc and (µab >µabc or τb = τac = 0) and (µac >µabc or τc = τab = 0)
Proof. The proof relies on Theorem 1. For (i), let us assume that γb ≥ γa, so that we have
τb+τbc ≥ τa+τac. We write:
δab(τ)= τa
√
τb+τbc
τa+τac
+τab−τbc
√
τa+τac
τb+τbc
−τc ≥ τa+τab−τbc−τc = γa−γc > 0
Hence, µab >µabc, as desired.
For (ii), it suffices to show that µac =µabc. As γc ≤ γa, we obtain as before δac(τ)≤ γa−γb = 0.
Hence, µac =µabc, as desired.
For (iii), we use the fact that γc ≤ γb. We obtain δbc(τ) ≤ γb−γa < 0. Hence, µbc = µabc, as
desired.
For (iv), it will be easier to show the claim with the ordering γb > γa = γc.14 As γb > γa, we
obtain δab(τ) ≥ γa−γc = 0, with a strict inequality only if τa > 0 or τbc > 0. We thus have two
possibilities: either µab >µabc (if δab(τ)> 0) or τa = τbc = 0. The argument for µac is the same.

We now prove Theorem 2.
Proof. We now consider each of the two possible cases of non-discriminatory equilibrium.
Equilibrium with: µab =µac >µbc.
Assume that σ is an equilibrium with µab = µac > µbc. As µab,µac > µbc, we get from Theorem
1 that
µab =−(
p
τa+τac−
p
τb+τbc)2, µac =−(
p
τa+τab−
p
τc+τbc)2
and that these formulas remain valid in a neighborhood of τ. Therefore, there is a ballot
profile τ′ arbitrarily close to τ such that µab > µac > µbc, and a ballot profile τ′′ for which
µac > µab > µbc. If σ was stable, σt would be a best response to both τ′ and τ′′. We obtain a
contradiction by considering type t = ca for which BR(ca | nτ′) = ac and BR(ca | nτ′′) = c for n
large enough.
Equilibrium with : µab =µac =µbc.
Assume that σ is an equilibrium with µab =µac =µbc. By application of Lemma 1, we have two
possibilities: either γa = γb = γc or (γa > γb = γc and τb = τac = τc = τab = 0). The second case
can be ruled out: we have by assumption rba > 0, so that τb > 0 or τab > 0.
We can find τ′ and τ′′ arbitrarily close to τ such that γ′a = γ′b > γ′c and γ′′a = γ′′c > γ′′b. In the
first case, pivot ab dominates, while pivot ac dominates in the second case, by application of
(ii) in Lemma 1. We get a contradiction as before by considering t= ca.

14The discriminant δab(τ) is defined as the difference between the expected scores of a and c conditional on tieab.
One could also prove the claim directly, by defining the symmetric discriminant defined as the difference between
the expected scores of b and c conditional on tieab.
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A.5. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Let σ be a direct equilibrium satisfying µab > µac > µbc. It follows from condition (*)
that γa = τa+τac, γb = τb+τbc and γc = τac+τbc. We observe that τacτbc < τaτb since we have
µab > µabc and τb < τac since µac > µabc. Combining the pair of previous inequalities implies
that τbc < τa, which, in turn, implies that γa > γc. Moreover, the inequality τb < τac implies on
its own that γc > γb. It follows that γa > γc > γb.
Let σ be an indirect equilibrium. By a direct application of Lemma 1, it cannot be that
γc > γa (considering all the possible values for γb). Therefore γa ≥ γc, and similarly γb ≥ γc.

A.6. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider a preference profile r′ in a neighborhood of r (the symmetric Condorcet cycle),
say for each t ∈T , |r t− r′t| ≤ ε. We have:
ra
r−a
≤ 1/3+ε
1/3−ε and
rca
rba
≥ 1/3−ε
ε
.
For ε small enough, we have that rca/rba > ra/r−a. Thus, no direct equilibrium exists with
µab >µac >µbc. Moreover, as rca/rba < 1, no direct equilibrium exists with µac >µab >µbc.
A symmetric argument applies for direct equilibria where b or c belongs to the two first
pivots. We conclude that there exists a neighborhood of r for which no direct equilibrium
exists. This set of preference profiles is of positive measure, which concludes the proof. 
A.7. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let σ be a stable equilibrium with µab >µac =µbc and let t ∈ {ac,bc}.
1. The proof relies on the offset theorem introduced in Myerson [2000]. The theorem es-
tablishes that events differing from each other by a single translation have a probability ratio
that can be computed using the offset ratios.
As σ is an equilibrium satisfying µab > µac = µbc, we must have τab = τc = 0 (as µab domi-
nates, ab and c are never best responses), τa ≥ τbc (as µbc =µabc) and τb ≥ τac (as µac =µabc).
Claim: The offset ratios are identical in events pivac, pivbc and tieabc.
Let us prove the claim for pivac and tieabc. By slightly abusing notation, we can write
pivac = {Za = Zbc}∩ {Zac > Zb} and tieabc = {Za = Zbc}∩ {Zac = Zb}. We first observe that the
offset ratios of ballots a and bc will be the same for the two events: they are each equal to the
corresponding offset ratio in the event {Za = Zbc}. Moreover, as τb ≥ τac, we have that for any
n, the most likely outcome in the event {Zac > Zb} belongs in fact to the event {Zac = Zb+1},
which implies that the two events admit the same offset ratios (from the definition of offset
ratios). In turn, the offset ratios of ballots ac and b are the same for events {Zac = Zb+1} and
{Zac = Zb}, which proves the claim.
From now on, we can thus write φm for the offset ratio of ballot m. We know from the
formulas derived in the main text that φm > 0 for any m ∈ {a,b,ac,bc}. Applying the offset
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theorem, we obtain that:
lim
n→∞
P[pivt,1abc | nτ]
P[tieabc | nτ]
=φt1 and limn→∞
P[[pivt,2abc | nτ]
P[tieabc | nτ]
=φt1t2 .
For the pivots with two candidates, let us focus on pivot ac. With the notations in the statement
of the theorem, this corresponds to i = a (the pivot under consideration is ac) and j = b (b is
the candidate not appearing in the pivot). Applying the offset theorem, we obtain:
lim
n→∞
P[pivtac | nτ]
P[pivac | nτ]
= lim
n→∞
(
P[pivac−t1 | nτ]
P[pivac | nτ]
+ P[pivac−t1t2 | nτ]
P[pivac | nτ]
)
=φt1 +φt1t2 .
What remains to be done is to compare the likelihood of events pivac and tieabc. We rely on two
observations: first, pivac = (pivac∪tieabc)− b, as {Zac > Zb}= {Zac ≥ Zb}− b. Second, the offset
ratio of b in pivac∪tieabc is the same as in any of these two events, precisely because φb is the
same in the two events. Applying the offset theorem, we can write:
lim
n→∞
P[pivac | nτ]
P[pivac | nτ]+P[tieabc | nτ]
= lim
n→∞
P[(pivac∪tieabc)−b | nτ]
P[pivac∪tieabc | nτ]
=φb
From this we obtain that limn→∞
P[pivac | nτ]
P[tieabc | nτ]
= φb
1−φb
, and we conclude that
lim
n→∞
P[pivtac | nτ]
P[tieabc | nτ]
= φb
1−φb
(φt1 +φt1t2).
Finally, by symmetry of the problem, we obtain a symmetric formula for the pivot bc. Note
that we have implicitly assumed in the proof that all offset ratios are different from 1. One can
check that the formulas remain valid if some offset ratios reach the value of 1, concluding the
proof of 1.
2. Applying the previous result, we obtain limn→∞∆(t | nτ)/P[tieabc | nτ]= g(ut) with
g(ut)=
1/φt1t2
1−1/φt1t2
(φt1 +φt1t2)
(
1−ut
2
)
+ φt1
1−φt1
(φt1 +φt1t2)
(−ut
2
)
+ (2φt1 +φt1t2)
(
1−2ut
6
)
.
Thus, for n large, the sign of ∆(t | nτ) is the same as the sign of g(ut). The function g is
decreasing and takes value 0 for u∗t ∈ (0,1), defined by:
u∗t =
(
φt1 +φt1t2
)( 3
φt1t2 −1
+1
)
+φt1(
φt1 +φt1t2
)( 3
φt1t2 −1
+ 3
1/φt1 −1
+2
)
+2φt1
.
As σ is an equilibrium, we conclude using Proposition 1 that ut < u∗t ⇒ σt = t1 and ut > u∗t ⇒
σt = t1t2.
Note again that, while we have assumed that the offset ratios are different from 1, the result
remains valid (defining u∗t as a limit), when some offset ratios reach this value. 
APPENDIX B. ALTERNATIVE MODEL WITH CORRELATION NEGLECT
In the benchmark model, voters condition on the ballot profile τ to determine their best
response (that is, they compute the sign of ∆(t | nτ) for each type t). If voters neglect this cor-
relation, they compute pivot probabilities assuming that the scores of the different candidates
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are independent random variables. In other words, rather that conditioning on the ballot pro-
file τ to compute pivot probabilities, a voter conditions on the score distribution γ assuming
that each pair Si,S j is a pair of independent random variables with respective expected scores
γi and γ j. As a simple corollary of Theorem 1, one can write that for any score distribution γ,
any type t ∈T and any pair ab of candidates:
1. µ[tieab]=−(pγa−pγb)2,
2. µ[tieabc]= 3
(
γaγbγc
) 1
3 −γa−γb−γc,
3. µ[pivtab]=
{
µ[tieab] if γ2c < γaγb,
µ[tieabc] if γ2c ≤ γaγb,
4. µ[tiet,1abc]=µ[tie
t,2
abc]=µ[tieabc].
Following the methods developed in the article, we obtain Theorem 5.
APPENDIX C. TECHNICAL DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide further justifications for our focus on stable equilibria. Starting
from a weaker definition of a (large) equilibrium, we first show that discriminatory and stable
equilibria coincide. Then, we prove that, for generic preference profiles, any equilibrium is
stable. Finally, we demonstrate that discriminatory equilibria, as defined by Myerson (with a
condition on relative pivot probabilities), coincide with the stricter definition of discriminatory
equilibria we use (with a condition on pivot magnitudes).
We start by stating a definition of a large equilibrium, considering the limit behaviour when
n→∞.
Definition 3. The pure strategy profile σ = (σt)t∈T is a large equilibrium if there is some n0
such that for any n≥ n0, for each t ∈T, σt ∈BR(t | nτ).
This definition is more practical, even if formally more restrictive, than that of a large equi-
librium in Myerson [2000], which is based the convergence of a sequence of finite-n-equilibria.
C.1. Equivalence between stable and discriminatory equilibria
We first provide a result reciprocal to Theorem 2: any discriminatory large equilibrium is
stable.
Proposition 5. Let σ be a discriminatory large equilibrium (µab >µac,µbc). Then, σ is a stable
equilibrium.
Proof. There are two kinds of discriminatory large equilibria: direct (µab >µac >µbc) and indi-
rect ones (µab >µac =µbc).
For a direct equilibrium, the conditions (*) and (**) identified in Section 4 must be satisfied.
These two conditions are strict inequalities on the ballot profile τ. Then, in any neighborhood
of τ, the magnitude ordering remains, and the best responses are identical: the equilibrium is
indeed stable.
For an indirect equilibrium with µab > µac = µbc, the conditions of Theorem 4 must be sat-
isfied. As the profile is in pure strategies, and r is assumed to exhibit no tie, we have that (i)
all the offset ratios lie strictly between 0 and 1, so that u∗ac,u∗bc ∈ (0,1); and (ii) the inequalities
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on τ justifying the magnitude ordering are strict. Therefore, in a neighborhood of τ, the mag-
nitude ordering is unchanged, and the values u∗ac,u∗bc move continuously. It follows that the
equilibrium is indeed stable. 
C.2. On the generic non-existence of non-stable equilibria
We establish that pure-strategy equilibria that are not stable only exist for a 0-measure set
of ordinal preference profiles.
Proposition 6. The set of preference profiles r for which a non-stable large equilibrium exists
(µab =µac >µbc or µab =µac =µbc) is of measure 0.
Proof. We consider each of the two possible cases of non-discriminatory large equilibrium.
Assume that σ is an equilibrium with µab =µac >µbc. As µab,µac >µbc, we get from Theorem
1 that
µab =−(
p
τa+τac−
p
τb+τbc)2 = µac =−(
p
τa+τab−
p
τc+τbc)2
and that these formulas remain valid in a neighborhood of τ. Therefore, such an equilibrium
cannot be found generically in a neighborhood of r (as strategies are pure).
Assume that σ is an equilibrium with µab = µac = µbc. As shown in the proof of Theorem 2,
the expected scores of two candidates must be equal. This cannot remain true generically in a
neighborhood of r.

C.3. On the notion of a discriminatory equilibrium
Myerson [2002] introduces the notion of discriminatory equilibrium in which one pivot event
between some pair of candidates is infinitely more likely than any other pivots event. For any
pair of candidates i j, the event pivi j is serious if limn→∞
P[pivi j |nτ]∑
K⊆K P[pivK |nτ] > 0. That is, the pivot
between i and j is serious if, in the event that a close race exists in the election, the conditional
probability that i and j are in this close race has a positive limit as the expected population
gets large. A candidate i is said to be serious if there is some other candidate j such that pivi j
is serious. According to Myerson [2002], a large equilibrium is discriminatory if and only if
there is a candidate in K who is not serious whereas we have assumed that a discriminatory
equilibrium is characterized by the ordering of the magnitudes being µab > µac,µbc up to a
relabeling of the candidates. The next theorem shows that both notions are identical.
Theorem 6. If a large equilibrium is not discriminatory: µab = µac ≥ µabc, then the relative
probabilities of pivots ab and ac do not diverge: P[pivab | nτ]/P[pivac | nτ] is bounded above and
bounded away from 0.
Proof. Let σ be a discriminatory equilibrium with µab = µac = µbc and assume that pivot ab is
infinitely more likely than the other pivots. We can apply the formula in Proposition 2 for the
magnitudes. The equality of all magnitudes imply that τa = τbc and τb = τac. Without loss of
generality, we may assume that τa ≥ τb. Let us show that, in this case, pivot ac is no less likely
than pivot ab. While the argument is done for the events pivK it extends to the events piv
t
K .
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We have Za, Zbc ∼P (τan) and Zb, Zac ∼P (τbn). We write:
P[pivab | nτ]=P[Za+Zac = Zb+Zbc > Zac+Zbc | nτ]
=P[Za+Zac = Zb+Zbc | nτ]P[Zb > Zac | Zb−Zac = Za−Zbc | nτ]
= 1
2
P[Za+Zac = Zb+Zbc | nτ] and
P[pivac | nτ]=P[Za+Zac = Zac+Zbc > Zb+Zbc | nτ]
=P[Za = Zbc | nτ]P[Zac > Zb | nτ]
= 1
2
P[Za = Zbc | nτ]
≥P[pivab | nτ].
We obtain the desired contradiction: pivot ab cannot be infinitely more likely than pivot ac at
the limit.
Finally, let us consider an equilibrium σ with µab = µac > µbc and assume that pivot ab is
infinitely more likely than the other pivots. Applying the formula in Proposition 2, we must
have: 
τacτbc < τaτb,
τb < τac,
µab = 2
√
(τa+τac)(τb+τbc)−1= 2pτaτbc+τb+τac−1=µac.
We can show that: P[pivac | nτ] = P[Za = Zbc, Zac > Zb | nτ] ∼n→+∞ P[Za = Zbc | nτ] and we
have P[pivab | nτ]=P[Za+Zac = Zb+Zbc, Za > Zbc]≤P[Za+Zac = Zb+Zbc | nτ].
Now, we use the fact that the difference between two Poisson distributions, Y ∼ P (λ) and
Y ′ ∼P (λ′), follows a Skellam distribution, and in particular:
P(Y =Y ′)= e−(λ+λ′)I0(2
p
λλ′),
where I0 is the modified Bessel function of the first kind. This function admits the following
asymptotic development for y large:
I0(y)∼y→∞ e
y√
2piy
, which yields ln(I0(y))= y− 12 ln(2piy)+ oy→∞(1).
Using this development, we obtain:
ln(P[Za = Zbc | nτ])
n
= (−τa−τbc+2pτaτbc)− 12n ln(4pinpτaτbc)+ on→∞(1)
=µac− 12n ln
(
4pin
p
τaτbc
)+ on→∞(1)
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and
ln(P[Za+Zac = Zb+Zbc | nτ])
n
=
(
−1+2
√
(τa+τac)(τb+τbc)
)
− 1
2n
ln
(
4pin
√
(τa+τac)(τb+τbc)
)
+ on→∞(1)
=µab−
1
2n
ln
(
4pin
√
(τa+τac)(τb+τbc)
)
+ on→∞(1).
As we have assumed µab =µac, we obtain:
P[pivac | nτ]
P[pivab | nτ]
≥
√
(τa+τac)(τb+τbc)p
τaτbc
+ on→∞(1).
This contradicts the assumption that pivot ab becomes infinitely more likely than the other
pivots at the limit. 
